Sign up for meetings on the sheet below:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/13ovx0deRg8mA3h5XVO95SLGQcZQMTAcbZiTKaGFTKvs/edit#gid=0 If signing up less than two days before the talk, please also email facultyadmin@economics.ox.ac.uk

Abstract:
Empirical analyses of school choice report standard statistics of student outcomes that are the same for a variety of different mechanisms. This paper explains this puzzle as being driven by two factors: market size and the invariance properties of the statistics for which the equivalence has been observed. In large markets, strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms lead to asymptotically the same realized outcome statistics. Furthermore, many standard mechanisms—such as serial dictatorship or top trading cycles—lead to the same expected outcome-statistics already in finite markets under the additional assumption that the distributions of preferences are exchangeable.

View the related paper: pycia.bol.ucla.edu/pycia-invariance.pdf