Competition, Persuasion, and Search
An agent engages in sequential search. He does not directly observe the quality of the goods he samples, but he can purchase signals designed by profit maximizing principal(s). We formulate the principal-agent relationship as a repeated contracting problem within a stopping game, and characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs. We show that when the agent’s search cost falls below a given threshold, competition does not impact how much surplus is generated in equilibrium nor how the surplus is divided. In contrast, competition benefits the agent at the expense of total surplus when the search cost exceeds that threshold. Our results challenge the view that monopoly decreases market efficiency, and moreover, suggest that it generates the highest value of information for the agent.
Date:
13 June 2025, 14:15
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room G
Speaker:
Teddy Mekonnen (Brown University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Edward Clark
