“Disclosure and Incentives in Teams,” and it is co-authored with João Ramos
“We consider a team-production environment augmented with a stage in which the team decides how to communicate their productive outcome to outside observers.
In this context, we characterize equilibrium disclosure of team-outcomes when team-disclosure choices aggregate individual recommendations through some deliberation procedure. We show that equilibria often involve partial disclosure of the team’s outcome, and establish a relation between the deliberation procedure and the observer’s equilibrium attribution of credit and blame for the team’s successes and failures across team-members. Further, we show that, through this credit/blame-attribution channel, a team’s deliberation procedure determines individuals’ incentives to contribute to team production. We then characterize productive environments where effort-incentives are maximized by unilateral disclosure protocols or procedures such that disclosure require more consensus.”
Date:
4 October 2023, 14:00
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room G or https://zoom.us/j/94428672489?pwd=c3N3a1FTRUpQcDJaVld4Tll5ekRzUT09
Speaker:
Paula Onuchic (University of Oxford)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Emma Heritage
