Full Implementation with Dynamic Information
We study dynamic information design for full implementation in dynamic supermodular games where players’ opportunities to revise their actions arrive stochastically. We show that noisy but conclusive bad news signals uniquely implement the largest equilibrium across all dynamic information structures. Such structures exhibit asymmetry, noise, and state-invariance: asymmetry skews future switching behavior—conditional on bad news not arriving—towards the designer-preferred action which incentivizes switching in the present; noise increases the probability that bad news does not arrive; state-invariance lifts the time-t optimality of continuation information structures to dynamic optimality. There is no multiplicity gap: the largest implementable equilibrium can be implemented uniquely. We discuss applications to macroeconomics, debt runs, and platform competition.
Date: 23 January 2024, 12:45 (Tuesday, 2nd week, Hilary 2024)
Venue: Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details: Chester Room
Speakers: Andrew Joshua Koh (MIT), Sivakorn Sanguanmoo (MIT), Kei Uzui (MIT)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Edward Clark