Agenda Control in Real Time
This paper models legislative decision making when an agenda setter proposes amendments in real time. We consider a setting in which voters are sophisticated and the agenda setter cannot commit to her future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite policy in every equilibrium regardless of the initial status quo. We show that this result applies to a broad class of policy spaces and legislative procedures. Our results overturn the conventional wisdom that voter sophistication on its own constrains an agenda setter’s power.
Date: 13 May 2022, 14:15 (Friday, 3rd week, Trinity 2022)
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room C or Join Zoom https://zoom.us/j/91802954429
Speaker: Nageeb Ali (Penn State University)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Emma Heritage