Frege’s puzzle - Andrew BaconThe Logic of Opacity (manuscript)
We explore the view that Frege’s puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz’s law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models to show that these logics are not degenerate.
Date:
23 February 2017, 18:00 (Thursday, 6th week, Hilary 2017)
Venue:
Ertegun House, 37a St Giles OX1 3LH
Speaker:
Dr Andrew Bacon (University of Oxford)
Organising department:
Faculty of Philosophy
Host:
Alexander Roberts (University of Oxford)
Part of:
The MLE Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Mario Baptiste
