Tailored Stories
To what extent is it possible to manipulate beliefs by providing interpretations of unknown events? I characterize the feasible posteriors across signals when the agent is exposed to a set of models to interpret observable signals and adopts the model that best fits what is observed. Because each signal could trigger the adoption of a different model, posteriors across signal realizations might not average to the prior. The scope of persuasion is large, even for a persuader who does not control or know the signal the agent observes. I apply this framework to political polarization, finance, lobbying, and self-persuasion.
Date:
14 February 2024, 11:00 (Wednesday, 5th week, Hilary 2024)
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room A
Speaker:
Chiara Aina (Harvard University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Political Economy Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Shreyasi Banerjee,
Edward Clark
