What God Would Do: the Status of Counterfactuals of Divine Freedom
Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom – conditional claims regarding how free creatures would act in various possible situation in which they might be placed – have been much discussed in recent years as part of the debates concerning the Molinist notion of divine providence. In comparison, counterfactuals of divine freedom – conditionals stating how God would freely act if placed in various circumstances – have been by and large ignored. The standard view has been that Molinists should view such conditionals as true only post-volitionally – i.e., that their truth would have to be a consequence of God’s will. In recent days, this consensus has been called into question. Such counterfactuals, it has been argued, should be seen by Molinists as pre-volitional. But (the argument continues) so categorizing them comes at a cost to Molinists: they can no longer consistently say that God rationally deliberates. In this talk, I will respond to this challenge to the standard Molinist view. If successful, the talk will allow us to return the counterfactuals of divine freedom to the status they have heretofore so blissfully enjoyed: that of the rightfully neglected.
Date: 1 May 2018, 20:15 (Tuesday, 2nd week, Trinity 2018)
Venue: Oriel College, Oriel Square OX1 4EW
Venue Details: Smaller SCR
Speaker: Prof Thomas Flint (University of Notre Dame)
Organising department: Faculty of Theology and Religion
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Andreia Gomes Da Costa Leite