An optimal test for strategic interaction in social and economic network formation between heterogeneous agents (Joint with Andrin Pelican)
We introduce an exact test optimized to detect whether agents’ preferences over network structure are interdependent. Interdependent preferences induce strategic behavior since the optimal set of links directed by agent i will vary with the configuration of links directed by other agents. We evaluate a null model against one where agents additionally behave strategically when forming links. Importantly, the null model incorporates agent-specific in- and out-degree heterogeneity and homophily on observable agent attributes. While the generously parameterized null model helps to guard against “spurious” rejections due to its misspecification (as opposed to actual strategic interaction), it also introduces a high dimensional nuisance parameter (specifically 2N + K2 such parameters, with N the number of agents in the network and K the number of possible agent attribute configurations). Under the null equilibrium is unique, but our hypothesis is nevertheless a composite one as the degree heterogeneity and homophily nuisance parameters may range freely across their parameter space. Under the alternative our model is incomplete; there may be multiple equilibrium network configurations and our test is agnostic about which one is selected. Motivated by size control, and exploiting the exponential family structure of our model under the null, we restrict ourselves to conditional tests. We characterize the exact null distribution of a family of conditional tests and introduce a novel Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for simulating this distribution. This simulation algorithm may be of independent interest. We also characterize the locally best test. The form of this test depends upon the gradient of the likelihood with respect to the strategic interaction parameter in the neighborhood of the null. Remarkably, this gradient, and consequently the form of the locally best test statistic, does not depend on how an equilibrium is selected. Exploiting this lack of dependence, we outline a feasible version of the locally best test. We present two illustrative applications. First, we test for whether nations behave strategically when choosing locations for overseas diplomatic missions. Second, we test for whether firms prefer to sell to firms with richer customer bases (i.e., whether firms value “indirect customers”). Some Monte Carlo experiments explore the size and power properties of our test in practice.

Link to paper: bryangraham.github.io/econometrics/downloads/working_papers/Testing_Paper/StrategicInteractionTesting.pdf

Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1GRwPBmtpUwstC4fdLZrnxfnARNYHedHykoRZG4Xq2Bo/edit#gid=0
Date: 30 April 2021, 14:15 (Friday, 1st week, Trinity 2021)
Venue: Held on Zoom
Speaker: Bryan Graham (UC Berkeley)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Econometrics Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Melis Clark