Do Incompetent Politicians Breed Populist Voters? (with Federico Boffa and Vincenzo Mollisi)
We exploit a sharp discontinuity in the compensation of local politicians in Italy as a function of municipal population. As their wage increases sharply, better politicians run for and get elected to local office, and local government becomes more efficient. Our key finding is that this plausibly exogenous improvement in the quality of local politicians causes a statistically and economically significant decline in support for the populist, anti-establishment Five-Star Movement in upper-level (regional, national, and European) elections, mostly in favor of the outgoing incumbents.
Date: 22 February 2022, 16:00 (Tuesday, 6th week, Hilary 2022)
Venue: Seminar Room G or Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/96750891094
Speaker: Giacomo Ponzetto (CREI Barcelona)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Applied Microeconomics Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Emma Heritage