Estimation of an auction model with strategic uncertainty
I propose a model for analysing bidding under strategic uncertainty. Bidders do not know the entire distribution of the bids of the other bidders. Instead, they only know the first M moments of the bid distribution. I estimate the model with experimental data. Preliminary analysis suggests that my decision model with knowledge of only the first moment predicts the bidders’ values better than an equilibrium-based model with knowledge of the entire distribution.
Date:
19 February 2020, 17:00 (Wednesday, 5th week, Hilary 2020)
Venue:
Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details:
Conference Room (L Staircase)
Speaker:
Bernhard Kasberger (University of Oxford)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Postdoctoral Fellows Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Melis Clark
