Trading Networks with Frictions
Abstract

We show how frictions and continuous transfers jointly affect equilibria in a model of matching in networks. Our model incorporates distortionary frictions such as transaction taxes, bargaining costs, and incomplete markets. When contracts are fully substitutable for firms, competitive equilibria exist and coincide with outcomes that satisfy a cooperative stability property called trail stability. In the presence of frictions, competitive equilibria might be neither stable nor (constrained) Pareto-efficient. In the absence of frictions, on the other hand, competitive equilibria are stable and in the core, even if utility is imperfectly transferable.

Read the full paper at the following link:
78218c1f-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/ravijagadeesan/trading-networks-frictions.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cp8OhwmOTvCWlDeHSueKwkPxw9lmhUto4yrgE6tYRKWAkuWxHsPRhO8tvxLDqBDVt6gqJk7gUEiL7DYVFuEpJMMmH94VAePTCZmUAT8M_unm3MynM0Z4VSYUTT8pJAdqEnUA01hI_ZBJTuEjY8NP0yESDnt6kPi6Yt22zHABEchuygWDHPnfgXEieRrnqCOWya1MlU7EKZ_XD6iGg8JUBeRlmCnF1cZSpOV8tOKWCdyhGyHfp4%3D&attredirects=1
Date: 26 April 2018, 13:00 (Thursday, 1st week, Trinity 2018)
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room C
Speaker: Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Organisers: Anne Pouliquen (University of Oxford), Erin Saunders (University of Oxford)
Part of: Department of Economics Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editors: Erin Saunders, Anne Pouliquen, Melis Clark