Making and Breaking Governments 2.0: Using A1 to Build Better Theory
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zoom.us/j/97156099278?pwd=bE1DNElhVmRRWkl1Q1lVSEI3UlRLdz09
Meeting ID: 971 5609 9278 Passcode: 324627

Theoretical models have struggled to make sharp predictions of which governments form in parliamentary systems and how long these governments last. We develop an AI algorithm to solve an analytically intractable coalition bargaining game. While AI models have penetrated most aspects of daily life, they have largely been ignored by political scientists. Formidable successes by AI models in solving games like Chess, Go, and especially a bluffing game like Poker, suggest they also have the potential to attack difficult political games. We find evidence that this is indeed the case for coalition bargaining.
Date: 6 February 2024, 12:30 (Tuesday, 4th week, Hilary 2024)
Venue: Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details: SCR (A staircase)
Speaker: Scott de Marchi (Duke University)
Organising department: Nuffield College
Organisers: Rachel Bernhard (Nuffield College), Tarik Abou-Chadi (Nuffield College)
Organiser contact email address: maxine.collett@nuffield.ox.ac.uk
Part of: Nuffield College Political Science Seminars
Booking required?: Not required
Booking url: https://zoom.us/j/97156099278?pwd=bE1DNElhVmRRWkl1Q1lVSEI3UlRLdz09
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Maxine Collett