Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences (CANCELLED)
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Abstract
New condition, which we call uniform monotonicity, is shown to be necessary and almost sucient for rationalizable implementation of correspondences. Uniform monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity and reduces to it in the case of functions. Maskin monotonicity, the key condition for Nash implementation, had also been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Our conclusion is that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are not only starkly different from, but also much weaker than those for Nash implementation, when we consider social choice correspondences. Thus, dropping rational expectations signicantly expands the class of rules that can be decentralized by communication-based economic institutions.
Date:
27 April 2018, 14:15 (Friday, 1st week, Trinity 2018)
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
IT Room
Speaker:
Roberto Serrano (Brown University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Organisers:
Anne Pouliquen (University of Oxford),
Erin Saunders (University of Oxford)
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Erin Saunders,
Anne Pouliquen,
Melis Clark
