Communication in the shadow of catastrophe
We study the role of risk in strategic information transmission. Revisiting the choice between delegation and communication, we find that a uniform scaling of variance has no effect on the optimal choice of authority, and thus in no adequate measure of risk. We, then, consider the effect of the shape of the distribution, in particular, the weight in the tails. We find that a high risk of extreme events diminishes the quality of information sharing. As a result, delegation of authority becomes relatively more attractive compared to communication in environments with more weight in the tails.

Please sig up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1bH85x-6DkQqESblvVoH5mySYRE0o8-4IIGx7I46Z4cE/edit#gid=0
Date: 26 February 2021, 15:15 (Friday, 6th week, Hilary 2021)
Venue: Held on Zoom
Speaker: Inga Deimen (University of Arizona)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Melis Clark