Union Leaders: Experimental Evidence from Myanmar
Social movements are catalysts for crucial institutional changes. To succeed, they must
coordinate members’ views (consensus building) and actions (mobilization). We study union leaders within Myanmar’s burgeoning labour movement. Union leaders are positively selected on both personality traits that enable them to influence others and ability but earn lower wages. In group discussions about workers’ views on an upcoming national minimum wage negotiation, randomly embedded leaders build consensus around the union’s preferred policy. In an experiment that mimics individual decision-making in a collective action set-up, leaders increase mobilization through coordination. Leaders empower social movements by building consensus that encourages mobilization.

Written with Laura Boudreau (Columbia University, CEPR, and IGC), Rocco Macchiavello (LSE Department of Management, STICERD, and IGC) and Mari Tanaka (Hitotsubashi University Institute of Economic Research)

sites.google.com/view/virginiaminni/research
Date: 22 May 2024, 12:30
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room G (third floor)
Speaker: Virginia Minni (London School of Economics)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Organisers: Alison Andrew (University of Oxford), Dennis Egger (University of Oxford), Niclas Moneke (University of Oxford)
Organiser contact email address: suzanne.george@economics.ox.ac.uk
Part of: CSAE Lunchtime Seminars
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Public
Editors: Suzanne George, Fiona Morsia, Claire Goode