Allocation Mechanisms Without Reduction
We study a simple variant of the house allocation problem (one-sided matching). We demonstrate that agents with recursive preferences may systematically prefer one allocation mechanism to the other, even among mechanisms that are considered to be the same in standard models, in the sense that they induce the same probability distribution over successful matchings. Using this, we propose a new Priority Groups mechanism and provide conditions under which it is preferred to two popular mechanisms, Random Top Cycle and Random Serial Dictatorship.

Link to paper: cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn.edu/dist/d/264/files/2017/01/Allocation_without_Reduction_ds.pdf

Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1WTp83AxJaVGv6sMlwBer43q68i43dAe9BSeyb26ypa4/edit#gid=0
Date: 28 May 2021, 14:15 (Friday, 5th week, Trinity 2021)
Venue: Held on Zoom
Speaker: David Dillenberger (University of Pennsylvania)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Melis Clark