Coalition-Proof Full Efficient Implementation
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and d’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet mechanisms implement efficient social choice by compensating each agent for the externalities that his report imposes on all other agents. Instead of aggregate compensations, which may lead to profitable coalitional deviations, this paper provides an alternative mechanism, in which each pair of agents directly compensate each other for the pairwise externalities they impose. Under the assumption of independent private values, any agent is guaranteed to receive his ex ante efficient payoff by reporting truthfully, regardless of others’ strategies. This absence of ex ante externalities makes the mechanism coalition-proof, and makes all equilibria efficient.

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docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1t147hTaa3u0f4TcsAmhz2TXceVzEh6×73LrUVIYxHDM/edit?usp=sharing
Date: 15 June 2018, 14:15 (Friday, 8th week, Trinity 2018)
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: IT Room
Speaker: Mikhail Safronov (University of Cambridge)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Organisers: Anne Pouliquen (University of Oxford), Erin Saunders (University of Oxford)
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editors: Erin Saunders, Anne Pouliquen, Melis Clark