When Colleges Compete: Signals, Noise, and Equilibrium Outcomes
We develop a model of college admissions with interdependent preferences and noisy signals, building on Milgrom & Weber (1982) and Azevedo & Leshno (2016). Using this model, we evaluate the equilibrium consequences of making admissions more correlated across schools. We show that increased correlation makes applicants better off, particularly those who are weaker, and makes matching less assortative. Our analysis also offers an informational rationale for why acceptance rates for early admissions exceed those of regular admissions.
Date: 28 February 2025, 14:15
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room G
Speaker: Ran Shorrer (Pennsylvania State University)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Edward Clark