Moral Disgust Responds to Bad Character
I will argue that social emotions, specifically shame, guilt, disgust and anger, serve the purpose of tracking the social value of other people (anger, disgust) and of tracking how other people see the social value of the self (guilt, shame). Moreover, anger and guilt seem adapted to track momentary social value focused on acts, while disgust and shame track chronic social value focused on a person’s enduring character. I will present studies in press or under review from our lab that demonstrate how disgust has more to do with perceived moral character than anger; how disgust also communicates moral character more strongly than anger; and how shame functions to represent the general image that many people have of us, while guilt functions to represent temporary judgments of acts that close people form of us.
Date:
26 January 2017, 12:00 (Thursday, 2nd week, Hilary 2017)
Venue:
Tinbergen Building, South Parks Road OX1 3PS
Venue Details:
Lecture Theatre C
Speaker:
Professor Roger Giner-Sorolla (University of Kent)
Organising department:
Department of Experimental Psychology
Organiser:
Professor Kia Nobre (University of Oxford)
Organiser contact email address:
hod.secretary@psy.ox.ac.uk
Host:
Professor Miles Hewstone (University of Oxford)
Part of:
Departmental Seminar Series (Experimental Psychology)
Topics:
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Charlotte Thompson-Grant
