Organized Information Transmission
In reality, the organizational structure of information — describing how information is transmitted to its recipients — is as important as its content. In this paper, we introduce families of (indirect) information structures, namely meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that capture the horizontal and vertical dimensions of real-world transmission. We characterize the outcomes that they implement in general (finite) games and show that they are optimal in binary-action environments with strategic complementarities. Our application to classical regime-change games illustrates the variety of optimal meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies as a function of the objective.

Please sign up for meetings here: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1bH85x-6DkQqESblvVoH5mySYRE0o8-4IIGx7I46Z4cE/edit#gid=0
Date: 5 March 2021, 14:15 (Friday, 7th week, Hilary 2021)
Venue: Held on Zoom
Speaker: Laurent Mathevet (New York University)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Melis Clark