k-prize Weighted Voting Game
We introduce a natural variant of the weighted voting game, which we refer to as the k-Prize Weighted Voting Game. Such a game consists of 𝑛 players with weights, and 𝑘 prizes, of differing values. Players in the game form coalitions, and the 𝑖-th largest coalition (by the sum of weights of its members) then wins the 𝑖-th largest prize, which is shared among its members. We present four solution concepts for the game, and fully characterise the existence of stable outcomes in games with uniform prizes, and in games with 3 players and 2 prizes. We also explore the efficiency of stable outcomes, namely whether they are Pareto-optimal or maximise utilitarian social welfare, and study the complexity of finding stable outcomes in such games.
Date: 18 November 2022, 12:45 (Friday, 6th week, Michaelmas 2022)
Venue: Venue to be announced
Speaker: Wei Chen Lee (University of Oxford)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Student Research Workshop in Micro Theory
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Emma Lane