How to Play Out of Equilibrium
Please note that the venue for this seminar has recently changed, and it it will now be held in Seminar Room A, Manor Road Building
To reserve a time to meet with the speaker, please register at the following form:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Lg_zRsQyTbf_WXqsVrZyfuoPeHVxRp9Mt9oiF9iSSIQ/edit#gid=0
Abstract:
We propose a novel concept for how to make choices in games without assuming that an equilibrium will be played. It can be applied when there are several players in the same role. The methodology is easy to implement, extremely versatile and can also incorporate incomplete information and uncertainty. We show its applicability in many examples, including Cournot and Bertrand competition and first price auctions. For instance, in markets modelled as double auctions we find it best for players to bid their true value, contrasting the finding for Nash equilibrium analysis that it is impossible to conduct trade efficiently.
Date:
13 October 2017, 14:15 (Friday, 1st week, Michaelmas 2017)
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room A
Speaker:
Karl Schlag (University of Vienna)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Erin Saunders,
Anne Pouliquen
