Identification and Estimation of a Dynamic Multi-Object Auction Model
In this paper I develop an empirical model of bidding and entry behaviour in re- peated simultaneous first-price auctions. The model is motivated by the fact that auctions rarely take place in isolation; they are often repeated over time, and multi- ple heterogeneous lots are regularly auctioned simultaneously. Incorrect modelling of bidders as myopic or as having additive preferences over lots can lead to inaccurate counterfactuals and welfare conclusions. I prove non-parametric identification of primi- tives in this model, and introduce a computationally feasible procedure to estimate this type of game.
Date: 28 May 2021, 12:45 (Friday, 5th week, Trinity 2021)
Venue: Held on Zoom
Speaker: Sam Altmann (University of Oxford)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Student Research Workshop in Micro Theory
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Melis Clark