A Model of Competing Narratives
We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a “clash of narratives”. Drawing on the “Bayesian Networks” literature, we model a narrative as a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximize a representative agent’s anticipatory utility – capturing the idea that public opinion favors hopeful narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sustain and their contribution to political polarization.

Please sign up for meetings below:
docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ywTkCR-sjBInsVwaWA_M7D2iF7QamyiaLY0qYxR1NOM/edit#gid=0
Date: 25 January 2019, 14:15 (Friday, 2nd week, Hilary 2019)
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room A
Speaker: Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University; and UCL)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Melis Clark