‘When Moral Intuitions go on Holiday’ - ‘Liability and Overdetermination’
The use of moral intuitions seems indispensable to doing moral philosophy, yet there is no consensus on what they are or what justificatory force they have. Without such a complete theory of moral intuitions we cannot tell the good ones from the bad. I won’t be providing such a theory. Instead I will make some modest, theory neutral claims about what conditions our use of moral intuitions should meet in order to be successful. Using these relatively uncontroversial criteria of successful use I will argue that some of our most commonly used species of moral intuitions are bad ones.
Date:
1 March 2017, 13:00 (Wednesday, 7th week, Hilary 2017)
Venue:
Radcliffe Humanities, Woodstock Road OX2 6GG
Venue Details:
Lecture Room
Speakers:
Gary O'Brien (University of Oxford),
Benjamin Lange (University of Oxford)
Organising department:
Faculty of Philosophy
Organiser:
Christopher Fowles (University of Oxford)
Part of:
The Ockham Society
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Mario Baptiste
