Selective Memory Equilibrium
When agents are more likely to remember some experiences than others but update beliefs as if the experiences they remember are the only ones that occurred, their limit strategy are selective memory equilibria. We illustrate how selective memory equilibrium can be used to understand the long-run effects of several well-documented memory biases. We then extend our analysis to cases where the expected number of recalled experiences is bounded and experiences that are recalled once are more likely to be
recalled again.
Date:
4 November 2022, 14:15 (Friday, 4th week, Michaelmas 2022)
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room G
Speaker:
Drew Fudenberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Melis Clark,
Emma Heritage
