Endogenous Information Acquisition in Cheap-Talk Games
This paper studies costly information acquisition and transmission. An expert communicates with a decision-maker about a state of nature by sending a cheap-talk message. In ecient equilibria, the expert generally reveals all acquired information to the decision-maker. I show the existence of ecient equilibria under general conditions. For the class of posterior separable cost structures, I derive properties of ecient experiments. Under posterior-mean preferences, any cheap-talk problem is solved by a convex combination of two bi-pooling policies. The best bi-pooling policies are characterized for the uniform-quadratic case. Contrary to existing cheap-talk models, monotone partitions are not always optimal.
Date:
24 February 2023, 14:15 (Friday, 6th week, Hilary 2023)
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room G or https://zoom.us/j/93867615769?pwd=VmRJVVRkYlhUajllTEJyd2NsTUs3QT09
Speaker:
Sophie Kreutzkamp (University of Bonn)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Public
Editor:
Emma Heritage
