On the optimal design of transfers and income-tax progressivity
We study the optimal design of means-tested transfers and progressive income taxes. In a simple analytical model, we show that adding a transfer to a log-linear tax induces welfare gains almost as large as in the second-best allocation. Transfers allow for more progressive average than marginal tax-and-transfer rates, achieving redistribution while preserving efficiency. In a rich dynamic model, we quantify the optimal fiscal plan. We use new flexible functions featuring targeted transfers and progressive income taxes, delivering a good empirical fit across the income distribution. Transfers should be larger than currently in the U.S. and financed with moderate income-tax progressivity.
Date: 7 March 2023, 13:15 (Tuesday, 8th week, Hilary 2023)
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room A or https://zoom.us/j/99960790792?pwd=L01NVnBQcGlqMVdQMHBiWDN3YmFMZz09
Speaker: Axelle Ferriere (Paris School of Economics)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Macroeconomics Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Public
Editor: Emma Heritage