Ontological Nihilism
I will argue that ontological nihilism, i.e. the view that there are no things is a consistent position. Secondly, I shall discuss an argument for the view that nihilism is not just possibly but actually true, that is that there actually are no things. I am going to conclude by some reflections on the consequences of the nihilist position for project of constructing a fundamental metaphysical theory.

(Wine and soft drinks will be provided)
Date: 9 May 2018, 17:00 (Wednesday, 3rd week, Trinity 2018)
Venue: Lady Margaret Hall, Norham Gardens OX2 6QA
Venue Details: Old Library Room
Speaker: Professor Jan Westerhoff
Organising department: Faculty of Theology and Religion
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editor: Andreia Gomes Da Costa Leite