Market Imperfections in Trading Networks
We develop a general model of matching in trading networks with heterogeneity and market imperfections. Our model allows for complementarities between inputs, distortionary frictions, externalities of both quantities and prices, technological constraints, and wealth effects. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive equilibria. When sales are substitutable, we show that nonlinear-pricing competitive equilibria coincide with outcomes that satisfy a cooperative solution concept that we call sequential stability.
Date:
22 January 2019, 12:45 (Tuesday, 2nd week, Hilary 2019)
Venue:
Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details:
Butler Room
Speakers:
Alex Teytelboym (University of Oxford),
Ravi Jagadeesan (Harvard University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Melis Clark
