A Universally Efficient Dynamic Auction for All Unimodular Demand Types
We propose a novel strategy-proof dynamic auction for efficiently allocating heterogeneous indivisible commodities. The auction applies to all unimodular demand types of Baldwin and Klemperer’s necessary and sufficient condition for competitive equilibrium which accommodate a variety of complements, substitutes, gross substitutes and complements, and any other kinds. Although bidders are not assumed to be price-takers so they can act strategically, this auction induces bidders to bid truthfully, yielding efficient outcomes. Sincere bidding is shown to be an ex post perfect equilibrium of the auction. The trading rules are simple, detail-free, privacy-preserving, error-tolerant, and independent of any probability distribution assumption.
Date:
11 November 2022, 14:15 (Friday, 5th week, Michaelmas 2022)
Venue:
Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details:
Seminar Room G
Speaker:
Zaifu Yang (University of York)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Melis Clark,
Emma Heritage
