Stability Implies Renegotiation-Proofness
The Generic Finiteness Theorem for outcomes of extensive-form games is extended to finitely complex repeated games. Components of equilibria are thus outcome-equivalent, and if they are also strongly symmetric and strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens, Econometrica 1986, 54:1003-1039), then I show that they generate the outcome of an efficient, renegotiation-proof equilibrium for two arbitrarily patient players.
Date:
22 October 2019, 12:45 (Tuesday, 2nd week, Michaelmas 2019)
Venue:
Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details:
Butler Room
Speaker:
Tom Norman (University of Oxford)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Part of:
Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editor:
Melis Clark
