Strategic Stability Index
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docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1t147hTaa3u0f4TcsAmhz2TXceVzEh6×73LrUVIYxHDM/edit#gid=0
Abstract:
Nash equilibria used in economics and other interactive systems are highly stable in a sense made precise in this paper. Low stability equilibria are less credible and require special care and possible modifications before being applied. The paper discusses an index of strategic stability for n-person normal form games. In addition to the definitions and related properties, it discusses the stability aspects of well-known and commonly observed Nash equilibria.
Date:
12 June 2018, 12:45 (Tuesday, 8th week, Trinity 2018)
Venue:
Nuffield College, New Road OX1 1NF
Venue Details:
Conference Room (L Staircase)
Speaker:
Ehud Kalai (Northwestern University)
Organising department:
Department of Economics
Organisers:
Anne Pouliquen (University of Oxford),
Erin Saunders (University of Oxford)
Part of:
Economic Theory Workshop
Booking required?:
Not required
Audience:
Members of the University only
Editors:
Erin Saunders,
Anne Pouliquen,
Melis Clark
