Price Discovery in a Large Auction with Costly Information
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We study a common-value auction in which a large number of identical, indivisible object are sold to a large number of ex-ante identical bidders with unit demand. There is costly information acquisition or costly entry. We derive the limit price distribution. This allows us to quantify the information content of price and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation.
Date: 19 October 2018, 14:00 (Friday, 2nd week, Michaelmas 2018)
Venue: Manor Road Building, Manor Road OX1 3UQ
Venue Details: Seminar Room A
Speaker: Alp Atakan (Queen Mary University of London; and Koc University)
Organising department: Department of Economics
Part of: Nuffield Economic Theory Seminar
Booking required?: Not required
Audience: Members of the University only
Editors: Erin Saunders, Melis Clark