SCIENCE AND RELIGION RESEARCH SEMINARS and IAN RAMSEY CENTRE LECTURES Michaelmas 2024, Weeks 2, 4, 6, and 8, 11am-12.30pm (seminars) and 5pm-6.30pm (lectures) The Gibson Lecture Room, Gibson Building, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter, Oxford OX26GG Evening lecture venues for Weeks 4 and 8 are indicated below for each date.
WEEK 2 – 23 October 11am-12.30pm (Seminar in the Gibson Building): Marta Bielinska, DPhil candidate in Science and Religion, University of Oxford: ‘A new account of the supernatural life’
Abstract: One of the central questions in theology is that of the relation between nature and the supernatural. This question takes various forms: from the long-standing nature-grace debate, to the issue of divine action in the natural world, and extending to meta-questions about the interaction between science and religion. In the context of human life, this becomes a question of how the natural life relates to the supernatural life. In my talk, I will address this question.
The debate over the relation between supernatural life and natural life saw a revival in the mid-20th century, largely due to Henri de Lubac. In his influential work Surnaturel, de Lubac challenged what he saw as the dominant view in Catholic theology of his time, which held that there existed a state of ‘pure nature‘—a state lacking in all divine elements. De Lubac believed that only the supernatural end of human life exists and a belief in the pure nature was a result of a misinterpretation of writings of Thomas Aquinas, initially proposed by Thomas Cajetan de Vio, and cultivated, closed to 20th century, by representatives of the so-called ‘Neo-Thomism’.
In this talk, I will present both accounts of the supernatural life: held by de Lubac and the Neo-Thomists, suggesting the key challenges each faces. I will then propose a new account of the supernatural, that builds on an ‘I-Thou’ relation with God. After formulating this account, I will examine whether it can be used to address the aforementioned problems with the two other accounts. Finally, I will explore the ways in which it can be appealing both to the supporters of de Lubac, according to whom there exists only the supernatural end, and to those inclined to advocate for the state of pure nature, such as Neo-Thomists.
WEEK 4 – 6 November 11am-12.30pm (Seminar in the Gibson Building) AND 5pm-6.30pm (Ian Ramsey Centre Lecture at St Anne’s College, Oxford): Jonathan Jong, Coventry University and the University of Oxford: ‘What is a (religious) belief?’
Abstract: Belief is an important folk psychological concept: we use it all the time in everyday life. It has also been adopted into philosophical and theological theorising, especially in work in religious epistemology. But its place in psychological science is still uncertain and undertheorised. In this talk, I will provide some background to the debates in psychological and cognitive science about belief, pitch a theory of belief, and muse about some implications for philosophy and theology.
The Revd Dr Jonathan Jong is an experimental psychologist and an Anglican priest. His most recent book is Experimenting with Religion: The New Science of Belief (OUP, 2023). Forthcoming are a two-volume resource on measuring religiosity and spirituality (Springer, 2025; with Peter Hill, Ralph Hood, Kevin Harris), and The Nature of Belief (OUP, 2025; with Eric Schwitzgebel). He is Editor of the Cambridge University Press series, Elements in Psychology of Religion.
WEEK 6 – 20 November 11am-12.30pm (Seminar in the Gibson Building): Christopher Oldfield, University of Cambridge: ‘Categorical Dualism’
Abstract: Categorical Dualism differs from Substance Dualism and from Property Dualism, by conceiving of soul and body as things of categorically different ontological types, neither one thing nor two things of one type. By the “soul” (psyche) and the “body” (soma) I have in mind two things, which hang together in some way, which I intend to be understood as a matter of ontological dependence: the soul being the activity in virtue of which
some body is where they are. For all I know, it could be the activity of the material parts of somebody in virtue of which there is somebody where they are, or the activity of an incorporeal being, but it could not be one of the parts of any body, or one of its functionally higher order properties. The “body” (soma) need not be capable of conscious perception, rational agency, independent existence, trans-temporal stability, or psychological continuity through time in order to be, or to have a soul. Categorical Dualism is thus compatible with a range of views on the so-called “mind-body” problem, the “body” problem, whatever philosophers mean by the words “human body”, or the persistence of human persons. I present Categorical Dualism as a ‘cornerstone of commonsense’ (Simons 1987) that is immune from standard criticisms of Substance Dualism (e.g. the interaction problem) and Property Dualism (e.g. the combination problem). It marks a distinction which we make ‘effortlessly’ (Wiggins 2012) that is of enduring significance to us as embodied thinkers. I conclude by questioning the priority of Jonathan Schaffer’s (2010) tiling constraint on individuals being in the same place at the same time, in light of David Wiggins’ (1968) remark on categories and materialism, and invite theological reflections on Jennifer Hornsby’s (2009, 2017) remarks about actions and activity, conceptual analysis and acts of faith. Christopher Oldfield is a philosopher at King’s College London, Trinity College Cambridge, and the Faraday Institute for Science and Religion. He works on foundational issues in the logic of scientific metaphysics, with special interests in the history and interpretations of “physicalism”. In 2025 he will be guest editing a special issue of Scientia et Fides, with William Simpson, on ‘Why Middle Sized Matters for Science and Religion’. For details of the call for papers and more see chrisoldfieldphilosophy.com
WEEK 8 – 4 December 11am-12.30pm (Seminar in the Gibson Building) AND 5pm-6.30pm (Ian Ramsey Centre Lecture at St Luke’s Chapel, Radcliffe Observatory Quarter, Oxford): Louise Hickman, Birmingham Newman University: ‘Likely stories: How the ancient drama of philosophy can help us think about the nonhuman world’
Abstract: Insights from narrative and literary fiction have come to play an important part of the science-and-religion discourse. This paper asks how such a discourse informed by narrative might be more fully inclusive of the nonhuman world. The risk that conceptions of narrative might be constricted by the dominance of written stories—and might borrow too much from a literary focus on coherence and plot—is identified, along with the exclusory tendencies of the textualization of narrative. These problems come to the fore when considering the nonhuman world. If evolution is told as a narrative of drama, it is humanity who has told this tale. Nature does not have a unified soundbox, while even vocal animals cannot produce sounds recognisable enough by us to contribute to a textualized version of the evolutionary epic. This paper will consider how the nonhuman might participate more fully in this story. It will do so by reflecting on how the problems with textualization, and its tendency to neglect context, sit centre-stage in ancient philosophy and are intertwined with shifting ideas of logos and myth. It is often forgotten that Plato wrote philosophy not in the form of treatises but as dramatic dialogue, often full of myth and abounding with animals. In the Platonic corpus, narrative is an integral part of gaining knowledge of the world. Plato’s dialogues also put before us a trenchant critique of writing. This paper will argue that revisiting this era of shift from oral to written culture, and the resultant debates about mythos, logos, truth, and human knowledge of the natural world, can point us towards a way of including nonhuman species more meaningfully in narrative by affirming the co-created nature of stories. Using insights from the dramatization of philosophy can help to shift the focus onto often overlooked questions about the ways in which narrative functions. Plato’s writing of animals and use of mythos foreshadows more recent insights showing us how animal narrative is inseparable from shifts in politics and science. Furthermore, it demonstrates the impossibility of distinguishing neatly between the different disciplines of science, literature, ethics, theology, and philosophy.
Dr Louise Hickman is Reader in Philosophy of Religion, and programme lead for taught post-graduate Theology provision at Birmingham Newman University. She studied for her first two degrees at the University of Exeter and completed her PhD at the University of Cambridge. She has published on various aspects of the history of philosophy, the philosophy of religion, and science and religion. From 2011-2018, she was editor of Reviews in Science and Religion. Louise is a Fellow of the International Society for Science and Religion and a Senior Fellow of the UK’s Higher Education Academy. She is also a trustee of the Trussell Trust.